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et al., 1999; Denis and McConnell, 2003; Gillan and Starks, 2003). Weaker investor protection gives share-
holders incentives to maintain large shareholdings to better control managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
Consequently, in low investor protection countries, such as France, ownership is more concentrated, mean-
ing the type I agency conﬂict between managers and shareholders is reduced, but agency conﬂicts between
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (called type II agency conﬂict) are higher (La Porta
et al., 1999).
In this paper, we investigate the inﬂuence of the nature of controlling shareholders on audit fees in France.
The expropriation risk of minority shareholders is likely to inﬂuence the demand for audit services, which is
usually measured by audit fees (Whisenant et al., 2003; Hope et al., 2010). Namely, auditing is a monitoring
cost that depends on the extent of agency conﬂicts, in the sense that auditors need to increase the scope of their
audit for ﬁrms with high agency conﬂicts because of increased audit risk (inherent and/or audit risk) and audi-
tor business risk (litigation risk) (Khalil et al., 2008). To our best knowledge, very few studies have investi-
gated the type II agency conﬂict in relation to the audit fees, including Fan and Wong (2005) in East Asia
and Khalil et al. (2008) in Canada. But France presents an interesting context for three main reasons: (1) it
is a country which has been used as a typical representative of a weak investor protection country (La Porta
et al., 1998; Deminor, 2005); (2) listed ﬁrms have high ownership concentrations (La Porta et al., 1999; Faccio
and Lang, 2002); and (3) there are varying ownership structures as a large proportion of ﬁrms are controlled
by the state or by families which actively participate in management (Djama and Boutant, 2006; Tre´bucq,
2007).
However the nature of controlling shareholders is likely to inﬂuence the risk of minority expropriation. For
instance Villalonga and Amit (2006) assume that families have stronger incentives to expropriate wealth from
minority shareholders than widely-held corporations because private beneﬁts of control are not diluted among
several independent owners. Several papers call for research (Hay et al., 2006) about the relationship between
the nature of ownership and audit fees, especially in a European continental setting where ownership struc-
tures are not as homogeneous as in Anglo–Saxon countries (Niemi, 2005).
We therefore investigate the inﬂuence of the identity of the controlling shareholder on audit fees using
regression analysis of French non-ﬁnancial listed ﬁrms during 2006–2008. Our results present new explana-
tions for previous ambiguous results about the relationship between audit fees and controlling ownership
(Niemi, 2005; Hay et al., 2006). First, we show two opposite eﬀects (alignment vs. entrenchment) depending
on the nature of ownership (family, institutional, government), while most prior studies assimilate both eﬀects
by using the sum of blockholder ownership (Peel and Clatworthy, 2001; Fan and Wong, 2005; Niemi, 2005).
Then, while many previous studies assume that institutional investors play a monitoring role in the corporate
governance of French listed ﬁrms (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 1997), we
ﬁnd that institutional ownership increases audit fees. We also ﬁnd a negative relationship between government
ownership and audit fees, which demonstrates that state representatives play a monitoring role in the corpo-
rate governance of French listed ﬁrms, which reduces audit risk and audit fees. Finally, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
relation between family ownership and audit fees which may be explained by the existence of two opposite
eﬀects (entrenchment vs. alignment): family ﬁrms face less severe type I agency conﬂict but more severe type
II agency conﬂict. Therefore, audit fees level may depend on the trade-oﬀ between the two types of agency
conﬂicts.
We contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, there is a lack of research on ﬁrm ownership
as a determinant of audit fees, particularly on the identity of non-managerial controlling shareholders (Niemi,
2005; Hay et al., 2006). Second, this study contributes to the research on corporate governance mechanisms
and provides evidence of the monitoring role of bureaucrats in state controlled ﬁrms in order to avoid repu-
tational loss. Lastly, this research conﬁrms that institutional investors constrain management to provide assur-
ance that ﬁnancial information is of high quality via high audit quality.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section (Section 2) provides the theoretical framework and
Section 3 develops our hypotheses. Section 4 presents the research design and Section 5 provides the sample
selection procedures and descriptive statistics. Regressions results are disclosed in Section 6. Finally, we
discuss the results and conclude in Section 7.
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2.1. Controlling shareholders and agency conﬂicts
Holderness (2009) ﬁnds that controlling shareholders are present in most listed ﬁrms all over the world.
Controlling shareholders can be deﬁned as those that have the possibility to select the board of directors
(or its majority) or exert pressure on them and inﬂuence the future of the ﬁrm (Berle and Means, 1932). While
concentrated ownership is considered as a substitute for weak investor protection regulation (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997, p. 753), it raises a new concern: minority investor expropriation (La Porta et al., 1998,
p. 1151, 2000, p. 4). In weak investor protection countries, controlling shareholders and minority shareholders
both have the right to the same dividend per share (Denis and McConnell, 2003). However, the former have
private beneﬁts of control and can increase their wealth in consuming additional perquisites to the detriment
of outsider shareholders. Consequently, when controlling shareholders have eﬀective control of the ﬁrm via a
high percentage of ownership, they have incentives to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1997), which leads to a higher agency conﬂict between controlling and minority shareholders, also
called type II agency costs. Hence investor protection turns out to be crucial because, in many countries,
expropriation of minority shareholders and creditors by the controlling shareholders is extensive (La Porta
et al., 2000, p. 4).
Expropriation can take many forms. Insiders can simply steal proﬁts, have excessive compensation or ben-
eﬁt from self-dealing transactions such as selling the output, assets or additional securities in the ﬁrm they con-
trol to another ﬁrm they own at below market prices (Johnson et al., 2000). “Tunnelling” allows controlling
shareholders to transfer ﬁrm assets and beneﬁts out of the reach of both creditors and minority shareholders
(Johnson et al., 2000).
2.2. Auditing and agency conﬂicts
Since the role of auditing is to enforce the application of proper accounting policies (Francis and Dechun,
2008, p. 157), auditing is part of the corporate governance system (Francis et al., 2003) whose cost has to be
born by shareholders as one key component of monitoring costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It is therefore
expected that auditors will spend more time, relative to the regular inspection of accounts, to inspect manag-
ers’ activities if agency problems are greater, which may lead to higher audit fees.
A large body of audit research has focused on the determinants of audit fees (Hay et al., 2006) since the
seminal work of Simunic (1980). This author developed an audit fee model which has become a landmark
in audit research. Its starting point is that auditors are jointly liable together with managers for ﬁnancial infor-
mation quality vis-a`-vis ﬁnancial statement users. Consequently, Simunic (1980) develops an audit fee model
that includes two components: audit eﬀort and risk premium.AUDFEE ¼ p  qþ EðLÞ
where AUDFEE is the amount of audit fees, p the hourly pricing, q the number of auditing hours, E(L) is the
risk premium, assessing the probability of expected losses.
The model is composed of two components: audit eﬀort and risk premium. The ﬁrst component (p * q) that
represents the audit eﬀort needed is based on the auditor evaluation of two risks. First, the risk that a signif-
icant error exists in the ﬁnancial statements (inherent risk). Second, the risk that the ﬁrm’s internal controls do
not detect it (control risk). Hence, for a client presenting a higher risk level, the auditor asks for higher fees to
cover higher costs (Simunic and Stein, 1996). Therefore, because ﬁrms facing opportunistic behavior of insid-
ers (Jensen, 1986) present higher inherent risk and higher control risk (Khalil et al., 2008), auditors charge
higher fee premiums. Many previous studies show that auditors consider agency costs, for instance the risk
of asset embezzlement, abusive use of perquisites, excessive executive compensation (Gul and Tsui, 1997,
2001; Jensen and Payne, 2005; Khalil et al., 2008).
The second component of Simunic’s model deals with the risk premium. Lyon and Maher (2005) argue that
much of the prior literature on auditor’s risk focuses on litigation risk, which is the risk of incurring liability
payments and of damaged reputation for the quality of its services (Palmrose, 1986; Francis and Simon, 1987;
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ies show the importance of the risk premium component in audit fee levels due to the positive relationship
between audit fees and litigation risk. First, Lafond and Roychowdhury (2008) assert that agency costs are
likely to increase the risk premium and therefore audit fees. As the French context has higher type II agency
conﬂicts, then higher audit fees should be expected (Fan and Wong, 2005). Second, Hope et al. (2010) suggest
that in a higher agency cost context, auditors are likely to provide greater eﬀort to prevent misstatement
related to moral hazard and adverse selection problems. We assume that higher agency conﬂicts are likely
to increase the two components of audit fees presented in Simunic’s model and therefore increase the total
amount of audit fees.
2.3. Audit fees and the nature of ownership
Hay et al. (2006) summarize the large body of audit fee determinants research using a meta-analysis and
conclude that the results on the relationship between blockholder ownership and audit fees are mixed. For
instance, Chan et al. (1993) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between insider ownership and audit fees for his
small ﬁrm sub-sample. Firth (1997) ﬁnds a non-signiﬁcant relationship between insider ownership concentra-
tion and audit fees on a sample of Norwegian ﬁrms. In France, Piot (2001) ﬁnds a non-signiﬁcant relationship
between insider ownership and the choice of big audit ﬁrms (audit quality). Finally Niemi (2005) tests Chan
et al. (1993) model on Finnish ﬁrms and ﬁnds a non-signiﬁcant relationship between audit fees and a measure
of combined managerial and non-managerial ownership concentration. This author argues that one explana-
tion for these mixed results is that these studies do not diﬀerentiate between managerial and non-managerial
ownership concentration, since the two types should have opposite eﬀects on audit fees. Niemi (2005) then
improves the explanatory power of his previous model when adding variables considering the type of control-
ling shareholders. Villalonga and Amit (2006) also suggest that the identity of controlling shareholders is likely
to inﬂuence minority expropriation risk. Indeed, when the dominant shareholder is a ﬁnancial institution or a
dispersed capital ﬁrm, the private beneﬁts of control are shared by all independent owners, which leads to a
dilution of the inherent advantage. However, when the dominant shareholder is an individual or a family, the
advantage resulting from the expropriation is superior because the beneﬁts are concentrated in the hands of
family members. Indeed, families or individuals have stronger motivations to expropriate. This demonstrates
the importance of the type of controlling ownership in the production and pricing of an audit. However, there
is a gap in the literature on this particular issue despite calls for such research (Hay et al., 2006).
In the following section we develop our hypotheses by distinguishing between three types of controlling
owners: family-controlled, institutional-controlled and state-controlled ﬁrms.
3. Hypotheses development
3.1. Family ownership
Previous studies show that the most common type of a controlling owner in France is a founding family
that usually participates in daily operations of the corporation (La Porta et al., 1999; Faccio and Lang,
2002; Labelle and Schatt, 2005). Hope et al. (2010) argue that it is easier to extract private beneﬁts for major
family owners that can strongly inﬂuence the board (for instance by choosing its members). The monitoring
eﬀectiveness of the board could therefore be impaired when its composition is determined primarily by the
CEO’s family. The authors suggest that this situation is likely to increase agency costs when there is a family
relation between the CEO and the major shareholder and auditors need to supply more eﬀort.
As previously mentioned, expropriation risk is higher when the controlling shareholder is a family since the
private beneﬁts remain within the family. Moreover, families often have voting rights in excess of their cash
ﬂow rights (La Porta et al., 1999, p. 26), which increases expropriation risk. Hirigoyen (2002) gives the exam-
ple of the Marine–Wendel family in France that utilizes ﬁnancial mechanisms to allocate to the family more
voting rights than their regular capital rights.
Other studies document a negative inﬂuence of the board dominated by family members. For instance, Ho
and Wong (2001) posit the ineﬃcacity of boards dominated by families. Jaggi and Leung (2007) ﬁnd that the
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boards, especially when family members dominate the corporate board. These characteristics are likely to
increase minority shareholder expropriation risk and consequently the type II agency conﬂict, which leads
to higher audit fees.
However, other arguments suggest the opposite: a negative relationship between family ownership and
audit fees. First, in the majority of family controlled ﬁrms, family members participate in management
(Pochet, 1998; La Porta et al., 1999; Hirigoyen, 2002). Hence, the control of the ﬁrm is directly exercised
by the major shareholders that have an evident interest in the company. Therefore, the agency conﬂict between
managers and shareholders (type I agency conﬂict) is reduced in these ﬁrms (Pochet, 1998). As suggested
before, audit fees are inﬂuenced by agency conﬂicts, therefore, auditors should ask for lower fees when audit-
ing family ﬁrms.
Also, family members that are in the top of the company have free access to information about the ﬁrm
(Chau and Gray, 2002; Hirigoyen, 2002; Pichard-Stamford, 2002). Hence, ﬁrms with signiﬁcant family own-
ership are likely to have less information asymmetry problems than their counterparts because there is less
separation of ownership and control (Ali et al., 2007; Francis et al., 2009). Therefore, there is lower demand
for assurance that the ﬁnancial statements do not include signiﬁcant errors. Francis et al. (2009) show a neg-
ative relationship in France between family ownership and audit quality, measured by the choice of Big four
auditing ﬁrms. Other research shows that family-owned ﬁrms have higher ﬁrm value and are associated with
higher earnings quality, proxied by lower abnormal accruals, greater earnings informativeness and less persis-
tence of transitory loss components in earnings (Mishra et al., 2001; Lennox, 2005; Dechun, 2006). Hence,
auditors spend less audit eﬀort and ask for a lower risk premium for family ﬁrms. Following these arguments,
we state hypothesis H1 as follows:
H1. Audit fees are negatively associated with family ownership.3.2. Government ownership
Niemi (2005) asserts that government ownership diﬀers from other forms of ownership. Denis and
McConnell (2003, p. 3) posit that “Government ownership represents an interesting hybrid of dispersed
and concentrated ownership”. Indeed, the authors claim that although state-owned corporations formally
have very concentrated ownership, they ultimately belong to people of the state, and in this regard ultimate
ownership is extremely dispersed. Niemi (2005, p. 309) suggests that this situation “creates a more pronounced
free-rider problem than in large listed companies with a diﬀuse ownership structure, where the shareholders
have no strong incentive to directly monitor management themselves because each shareholder has only a
small investment in the ﬁrm”. However, in state controlled ﬁrms, the de facto control rights belong to bureau-
crats: “These bureaucrats can be thought of as having extremely concentrated control rights, but no signiﬁcant
cash ﬂow rights because the cash ﬂow ownership of state ﬁrms is eﬀectively dispersed amongst the taxpayers of
the country” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p. 768). Also, Chen et al. (2011) argue that directors who are nom-
inated by the government are easily in the position of controlling every aspect of decision making without
proper monitoring. These arguments therefore suggest high audit fees.
However, other arguments suggest lower audit fees. First, government representatives have an incentive to
monitor management for reputation purposes. “Reputation signals the quality of a director and its inﬂuence
outweighs the negative busyness eﬀect” (Chun-An and Chuan-Ying, 2008, p. 134) which contributes to a
decrease in ﬁrm risk and hence in audit fees. Also, if government representatives fail to monitor management
eﬀectively, they may suﬀer reputation costs. Second, other authors show that government ownership is a
mechanism of shareholder protection and can avoid minority expropriation. Using a sample of 634 privatized
enterprises listed on Chinese stock exchanges during the period 1994–1998, Sun and Tong (2003, p. 188) show
that “being the largest stakeholder of partially privatized state owned enterprises, the government sends a
credible signal to the market that it is not expropriating shareholders’ wealth”. This situation could negatively
inﬂuence audit fees as it decreases the scope of the audit.
Also, using signaling theory, Mok and Hui (1998) ﬁnd that Chinese ﬁrms with high government ownership
have higher ﬁrm value. The authors argue that high equity retention by the state after the IPO is likely to
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ment’s conﬁdence in the company and its business model. This situation suggests that these ﬁrms have lower
business risk and that auditors will therefore spend less eﬀort to audit these ﬁrms and ask for lower audit fees.
Trien and Chizema (2011) explain the positive relationship between performance and government holdings as
the support of these ﬁrms by the state. The authors argue that after privatization when a dominant share-
holder is the state, it is very likely to provide ﬁrms with ﬁnancial and political support through a “helping
hand”. Finally “state owned ﬁrms have both the motives and the expertise to monitor managers of listed
spin-oﬀ ﬁrms and to provide strategic advice” (Chen et al., 2009, p. 174). We therefore state the following
hypothesis:
H2. Audit fees are negatively associated with government ownership.3.3. Institutional ownership
Mitra et al. (2007) suggest that institutional and non-institutional blockholders are likely to have diﬀerent
abilities to monitor ﬁrm management because of diﬀerences in their analytical and information processing
resources. Therefore, the authors argue that “the eﬀect of their monitoring on a ﬁrm’s inherent risk or the
eﬀect of their demand for high-quality audit coverage may lead to diﬀerential relationships between the nature
of the blockholder stock ownership and audit fees” (Mitra et al., 2007, p. 266).
Previous studies document that institutional investors are on average better informed than individual inves-
tors because of their large-scale development and analysis of timely and valuable ﬁrm-speciﬁc information.
Moreover, in order to satisfy their ﬁduciary responsibilities, institutional investors are active monitors, which
in turn reduces agency costs (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 1997; Bushee,
1998; Mitra and Cready, 2005). For instance, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (1997) ﬁnd a negative relationship
between institutional ownership and discretionary accounting behavior (measured by discretionary accruals).
The authors conclude that institutional owners constrain managerial discretion by mitigating earnings manip-
ulation. Also Bushee (1998) uses two subsamples (high vs. low institutional ownership ﬁrms) and ﬁnds that
low institutional ownership ﬁrms manipulate R&D expenditure to meet short-term earnings goals. He con-
cludes that institutional investors play a monitoring role by reducing management’s discretion. Mitra and
Cready (2005) ﬁnd evidence that institutional stockholders constrain management’s ability to opportunisti-
cally manage abnormal accruals in the ﬁnancial reporting process. Firms with substantial institutional stock
ownership exercise less accounting discretion to manage abnormal accruals than ﬁrms with low levels of insti-
tutional ownership. Consistent with the above notion, Mitra et al. (2007) suggest that institutional blockhold-
ers are engaged in the company’s aﬀairs, including the ﬁnancial accounting and reporting process which is
likely to reduce the inherent risk of material misstatements in ﬁnancial reporting. Hence this low-risk situation
leads to lower engagement eﬀort from auditors and a lower risk premium, therefore audit fees should decrease
in institutional controlled ﬁrms. Consistent with the arguments above (monitoring role of institutional inves-
tors), Mitra et al. (2007) ﬁnd a negative relationship between institutional blockholders and audit fees.
However, other empirical studies investigating institutional monitoring ﬁnd mixed evidence (Smith, 1996;
Wahal, 1996). For instance, Smith (1996) ﬁnds no signiﬁcant change in operating performance for the 51 ﬁrms
targeted by CalPERS studied over the 1987–93 period. Also, Wahal (1996) ﬁnd no evidence of signiﬁcant long-
term performance improvement for ﬁrms targeted by pension funds.
Moreover other arguments sustain a positive relation between institutional stock ownership and audit fees.
Auditors are external parties that verify the quality and reliability of the information provided to shareholders
by managers. Therefore, prior research shows that high quality auditing translates into high earnings quality
(Becker et al., 1998; Kane and Velury, 2004). For instance, Becker et al. (1998) measure audit quality with Big
Six audit/non-Big Six auditors. The authors ﬁnd that clients of non-Big Six auditors (weak audit) report dis-
cretionary accruals that are, on average, 1.5–2.1% of total assets higher than the discretionary accruals
reported by clients of Big Six auditors. Because institutional investors demand high quality information, they
demand high audit quality. Kane and Velury (2004) ﬁnd a positive association between institutional ownership
and auditor size (as a measure of audit quality) and suggest that institutional investors have a positive
inﬂuence on audit services. The authors argue that “because earnings information is important for business
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Hence, when institutional investors hold large voting rights, they have the means to successfully encourage
management to provide assurance that ﬁnancial information is of high quality via high audit quality. Finally,
Mitra et al. (2007) also suggest that ﬁrms may tend to purchase high-quality audit services to create a positive
perception about ﬁnancial reporting quality in order to attract institutional investment, which therefore
should increase audit fees. Following these arguments, we state the following hypothesis:
H3. Audit fees are positively associated with institutional ownership.4. Research design
We use the following regression model to test our hypotheses:Table
Variab
Variab
Depend
LOGF
FAMit
GOUV
INSTit
FAM1
GOUV
INST1
%FAM
%GOU
%INST
Firm-S
LOGA
LEVit=
INVEC
INTSA
ROAitLOGFEE ¼ b0 þ b1 %FAMþ b2 %GOUV þ b3 %INSTþ d1 LOGASSETþ d2 INTSALE
þ d3 INVREC þ d4 LEVþ d5 ROAþ Fixed effectsþ where LOGFEE is deﬁned by the natural logarithm of audit fees (in K€). All variables are deﬁned in Table 1.
The test variable for H1 is %FAM and represents family control of the ﬁrm, as proxied by the percentage of
shares owned by identiﬁed individuals or families with more than 5%. The coeﬃcient on %FAM (b1) thus cap-
tures the audit fee discount/premium in the case of family ownership. As H1 states a negative relationship
between audit fees and family ownership, we expect b1 to be negative.
In a similar way, the test variable for H2 is %GOUV and represents state control of the ﬁrm, as proxied by
the percentage of shares owned by the state with more than 5%. The coeﬃcient on %GOUV (b2) thus captures
the audit fee discount/premium in the case of state ownership. As H2 states a negative relationship between
audit fees and state ownership, we expect b2 to be negative. Finally, the test variable for H3 is %INST and
represents control of the ﬁrm by institutional investors, as proxied by the percentage of shares owned by insti-
tutional investors with more than 5%. The coeﬃcient on %INST (b3) thus captures the audit fee premium in
the case of institutional ownership. As H3 is states a positive relationship between audit fees and institutional
ownership, we expect b3 to be positive.
Our audit fee model includes two types of ﬁrm speciﬁc control variables, which control for: (1) audit costs
(size and complexity); and (2) the risk of loss that an audit could face in the future (Simunic, 1980; Francis,1
le deﬁnitions.
le Empirical deﬁnition Data source
ent variable and test variables for Firm i in Year t
EEit= Natural log of audit fees (in k€) Worldscope
= 1 If at least one shareholder owning more than 5% of the share rights is an identiﬁed individual or
family, 0 otherwise.
Thomson
it= 1 If at least one shareholder owning more than 5% of the share rights is a state agency, 0 otherwise. Thomson
= 1 If at least one shareholder owning more than 5% of the share rights is an institutional investor, 0
otherwise.
Thomson
it= 1 If the primary shareholder is an identiﬁed individual or family, 0 otherwise. Thomson
1it= 1 If the primary shareholder is a state agency, 0 otherwise. Thomson
it= 1 If the primary shareholder is an institutional investor, 0 otherwise. Thomson
it= % Of shares owned by families with more than 5%. Thomson
Vit= % Of shares owned by state agencies with more than 5%. Thomson
it= % Of shares owned by institutional investors with more than 5%. Thomson
peciﬁc control variables for Firm i in Year t
SSETit= Natural log of total assets (in k€) Worldscope
The ratio of year-end total debt to total assets Worldscope
it= The sum of inventories and receivables divided by total sales Worldscope
LEit= Foreign sales divided by total sales Worldscope
= Return on assets Worldscope
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which proxy for client complexity: INVREC and INTSALE. Similar to Simunic (1980) and Choi et al. (2009),
we include LEV and ROA to measure client-speciﬁc litigation risk potentially borne by auditors1. As client
size, client complexity and client-speciﬁc risks should be positively related to audit fees, we expect all the coef-
ﬁcients from d1 to d4 to be positive and d5 to be negative. Finally, our model also includes ﬁxed year eﬀects and
an error term (e).
5. Sample
5.1. Data collection
Our sample is initially composed of all listed ﬁrms on the SBF 250 French index, meaning 244 ﬁrms over
the period 2006–2008. The French auditing context is characterized by (1) a mandatory joint audit for all listed
ﬁrms and all ﬁrms reporting consolidated ﬁnancial statements; (2) the prohibition of non-audit service provi-
sion for statutory auditors; and (3) a 6 year-tenure. These institutional characteristics are aimed at improving
auditor’s independence by reducing the economic bondage between the client and its auditors.
Audit fee data and ﬁnancial data are collected from Worldscope and ownership data is collected from
Thomson. We exclude 33 ﬁnancial institutions (Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation [SIC] 6000–6999) and obser-
vations with missing ﬁnancial data from Worldscope. All continuous dependent variables are winsorized at
the 1st percentile. We ﬁnally obtained a sample of 476 ﬁrm-year observations (hereafter named ﬁrm observa-
tions for ease of notation).
5.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables.
According to Table 2, Panel A average audit fees are 5.09 M€ (median: 1.30) over the period (2006–2008).
This average amount is consistent with previous literature (mean: 4.45 M€ (median: 1.38 M€) for Gonthier-
Besacier and Schatt (2007) on the SBF 250 index in 2002, and mean: 4.8 M€ for Broye (2009) on the Eurolist
in 2005). We observe a wide diversity with a minimum of 0.02 M€ and a maximum of 52.50 M€. Table 2, Panel
B presents the time evolution of audit fees over the period. We report the audit fees scaled by total sales (FEE-
PCT) to control for the size eﬀect which is the ﬁrst driver of audit fees (Hay et al., 2006). On average, audit fees
represent 0.18% of sales across the period, with signiﬁcant annual variations from 0.16% in 2006 to 0.19% in
2008.
Control variables display a large range, which illustrates the great diversity of the ﬁrms selected in our sam-
ple. For instance, the leverage ratio has a minimum of 0.1% and a maximum of 64.8%, with a mean of 24.1%,
and ROA has a minimum of 22.5% and a maximum of 25.9%, with a mean of 6.2%.
Table 3 details the sample according to the nature of the shareholders.
We use two dummy variables: the nature of the controlling shareholder owning more than 5% of the capital
shares and the nature of the ﬁrst shareholder. If we take the ﬁrst (second) deﬁnition, we observe that our sam-
ple includes 38.4% (34.0%) family ﬁrms, 6.1% (5.7%) state controlled ﬁrms and 42.6% (19.7%) ﬁrms controlled
by institutional investors (funds, banks, insurance companies, etc.). Both measures report similar results: fam-
ily and state shareholders are mainly the primary shareholders, whereas institutional shareholders are mostly
not the primary shareholder.
Table 3 also shows the level of concentration of shareholdings in France, as reported by the variable
%SHARE which corresponds to %FAM (%GOUV and %INST) when the major shareholders are family
(state and institutional investors). We see that family-controlled ﬁrms own 48% of outstanding shares. Overall
we observe an average family ownership concentration of 18.5%, which is consistent with Francis et al. (2009)
who report average family ownership of 25% in France. This concentration is higher than the mean of 7.4%
for family ownership concentration observed for Standards & Poors listed US ﬁrms (Dechun, 2006). State1 We did not include audit ﬁrm size (BIG) to capture the Big 4 premium (Francis, 1984), as Worldscope publishes only one auditor’s
name, while France makes joint audit mandatory for listed ﬁrms.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
N Mean sd Min p25 p50 p75 Max
Panel A: continuous variables
Audit fees (k€) FEE 476 5 088 8 037 16 524 1 297 6 635 52 500
Log (audit fees (k€)) LOGFEE 476 7.4 1.6 2.7 6.3 7.2 8.8 10.9
% Shares owned by families with more than 5% %FAM 476 0.185 0.269 0 0 0 0.381 0.935
% Shares owned by state agencies with more than 5% %GOUV 476 0.030 0.133 0 0 0 0 0.873
% Shares owned by institutional investors with more
than 5%
%INST 476 0.077 0.143 0 0 0 0.089 0.857
Total assets (M€) ASSET 476 10
100
20
100
57 405 1 310 7 610 104
000
Log (total assets (k€)) LOGASSET 476 14.4 1.9 11.0 12.9 14.1 15.8 18.5
(Accounts receivables + inventory)/total assets INVREC 476 0.338 0.176 0.033 0.21 0.311 0.452 0.788
Internationals sales/total sales INTSALE 476 0.448 0.291 0.217 0.468 0.684 1
Leverage LEV 476 0.241 0.149 0.001 0.134 0.227 0.342 0.648
Return on assets ROA 476 0.062 0.059 0.225 0.036 0.058 0.087 0.259
2006 2007 2008 Average
Panel B: audit fees by year
Audit fees (k€) FEE 5 456 4 898 4 954 5 088
Audit fees/sales FEEPCT 0.16% 0.19% 0.19% 0.18%
N 145 164 167 476
Note: All continuous dependent variables are winsorized (0.01).
Table 3
Nature of shareholders.
Variable N % %SHARE FEEPCT Variable N % %SHARE FEEPCT
Non-family FAM =0 293 61.6% 0.00% 0.19% FAM1 =0 314 66.0% 0.01% 0.18%
Family =1 183 38.4% 48.0% 0.17% =1 162 34.0% 52.3% 0.17%
Total 476 100.0% 18.5% 0.18% 476 100.0% 18.5% 0.18%
t-Tests (t-values) 0.641 0.382
Non-government GOUV =0 447 93.9% 0.00% 0.19% GOUV1 =0 449 94.3% 0.01% 0.19%
Government =1 29 6.1% 49.8% 0.07% =1 27 5.7% 53.06% 0.06%
Total 476 100.0% 3.00% 0.18% 476 100.0% 3.00% 0.18%
t-Tests (t-values) 5.725*** 5.831***
Non-institutional INST =0 273 57.4% 0.00% 0.16% INST1 =0 382 80.3% 3.2% 0.16%
Institutional =1 203 42.6% 18.2% 0.20% =1 94 19.7% 26.0% 0.25%
Total 476 100.0% 7.70% 0.18% 476 100.0% 7.70% 0.18%
t-Tests (t-values) 1.052 1.081
FEEPCT = Audit fees/sales; FAM = 1 if at least one shareholder owning more than 5% of the share rights is an identiﬁed individual or
family, 0 otherwise; GOUV = 1 if at least one shareholder owning more than 5% of the share rights is a state agency, 0 otherwise;
INST = 1 if at least one shareholder owning more than 5% of the share rights is an institutional investor, 0 otherwise; FAM1 = 1 if the
primary shareholder is an identiﬁed individual or family, 0 otherwise; GOUV1 = 1 if the primary shareholder is a state agency, 0
otherwise; INST1 = 1 if the primary shareholder is an institutional investor, 0 otherwise; and %SHARE = % of shares owned by (families/
state agencies/institutional investors) with more than 5%.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, two-tailed tests, two-sample t-test with unequal variances.
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concentration is consistent with the high risk of minority expropriation as identiﬁed by La Porta et al.
(1998) for France, for whom the capital concentration equals 34% (1998, p. 1149) for the top 3 shareholders
of the top ten non-ﬁnancial listed French ﬁrms.
Finally Table 3 discloses the audit fees (in % of sales: FEEPCT) according to the nature of the sharehold-
ing. We observe that audit fees are not statistically diﬀerent in family vs. non-family ﬁrms and to a lesser extent
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lower audit fees than non-state controlled ﬁrms (FEEPCT = 0.07% vs. 0.19%, p < 0.01).6. Results
Table 4 displays the correlation matrix of the dependent variable (LOGFEE) and the set of independent
variables.
This matrix shows that the independent variable (LOGFEE) is negatively and signiﬁcantly correlated at 1%
with the family nature of ownership concentration (%FAM), the inventory and receivables account (INV-
REC) and Return On Assets (ROA). LOGFEE is also positively and signiﬁcantly correlated at 1% with
the state nature of ownership concentration (%GOUV), assets (LOGASSET), leverage (LEV) and interna-
tional sales (INTPCT). The direction of correlations is only partially consistent with our hypotheses. We
therefore must run the multivariate analysis before reaching any conclusions on the relationships.
The magnitudes of the pairwise correlations among ﬁrm speciﬁc variables do not exceed 0.5, with the high-
est signiﬁcant correlation being between LOGASSET and INTSALES (coeﬀ. = 0.349, p < 0.01). We therefore
may have no strong colinearity issues, which we will monitor by reporting VIF indicators. Lastly, the three
proxies of the nature of ownership are obviously highly correlated, which raises no concerns as these measures
will not be included in the same regressions.
Table 5 presents our multivariate regression results and reports the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates
for the model discussed above. P-values are computed using robust standard errors, adjusted for heteroske-
dasticity and clustered at the ﬁrm level. We include ﬁxed year eﬀects in all regressions.
First, we observe a non-signiﬁcant relationship between audit fees (LOGFEE) and family-controlled ﬁrms,
which contradicts H1: “Audit fees are negatively associated with family ownership”. One possible explanation
is the presence of two opposite eﬀects: entrenchment eﬀect and alignment eﬀect of family ownership as sug-
gested by Chau and Leung (2006) and Ali et al. (2007). Hence, the relationship between audit fees and family
ownership is dependent on the trade-oﬀ between these two conﬂicts (Ali et al., 2007, p. 242).
Second, our model reports a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient between audit fees (LOGFEE) and state
ownership (coeﬀ. = 0.639, p < 0.01). Hence H2: “Audit fees are negatively associated with state ownership”
is validated. This result is consistent with the argument of Sun and Tong (2003) about the role of government
ownership in preventing shareholders’ wealth expropriation, which should reduce audit fees. Also, state rep-
resentatives should eﬀectively control managers because if they fail to do so, they may bear reputation costs.
This ﬁnding also conﬁrms the result of Mok and Hui (1998) that a high state shareholding is a signal to theTable 4
Correlations.
LOGFEE %FAM %GOUV %INST LOGASSET INVREC INTSALE LEV ROA
LOGFEE 1
%FAM 0.400*** 1
%GOUV 0.180*** 0.156*** 1
%INST 0.053 0.194*** 0.098** 1
LOGASSET 0.905*** 0.395*** 0.275*** 0.105** 1
INVREC 0.197*** 0.208*** 0.155*** 0.023 0.253*** 1
INTSALE 0.453*** 0.245*** 0.087* 0.0232 0.349*** 0.044 1
LEV 0.178*** -0.061 0.0476 0.0697 0.244*** 0.224*** 0.038 1
ROA 0.199*** 0.112** 0.062 0.001 0.158*** 0.002 0.012 0.200*** 1
Two-tailed tests.
LOGFEE = natural log of audit fees (k€); %FAM= % of shares owned by families with more than 5%; %GOUV = % of shares owned by
state agencies with more than 5%; %INST = % of shares owned by institutional investors with more than 5%; LOGASSET = natural log
of total assets (k€); LEV = ratio of year-end total debt to total assets; INVEC = sum of inventories and receivables divided by total sales;
INTSALE = foreign sales divided by total sales; and ROA = return on assets.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.
Table 5
Regressions.
LOGFEE Expected Model
Signs b p vif
%FAM ± 0.108 0.535 1.346
%GOUV ± 0.639*** 0.006 1.181
%INST ± 0.371* 0.093 1.12
LOGASSET + 0.722*** 0.001 1.647
INVREC + 0.013 0.964 1.155
INTSALE + 0.767*** 0.001 1.269
LEV + 0.518 0.208 1.197
ROA  2.094*** 0.004 1.091
Constant 3.098*** 0.001
Year eﬀect Included
N 476
Adjusted R2 0.847
p-Value 0.001
Schwartz BIC 959
Mean (VIF) 1.27
LOGFEE = natural log of audit fees (k€); %FAM = % of shares owned by families with more than 5%; %GOUV = % of shares owned by
state agencies with more than 5%; %INST = % of shares owned by institutional investors with more than 5%; LOGASSET = natural log
of total assets (k€); LEV = ratio of year-end total debt to total assets; INVEC = sum of inventories and receivables divided by total sales;
INTSALE = foreign sales divided by total sales; and ROA = return on assets.
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, two-tailed tests.
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conﬂicts causing a decrease in audit fees.
Third, we ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient between audit fees (LOGFEE) and institutional investor
ownership (coeﬀ. = 0.371, p < 0.10). Hence H3: “Audit fees are positively associated with institutional own-
ership” is validated.
Our result is consistent with previous results that ﬁnd a positive association between institutional ownership
and auditor size (Kane and Velury, 2004) and conﬁrms that institutional investors demand high quality infor-
mation and therefore ask for high audit quality (proxied by audit size). These authors suggest that institutional
investors increase audit services which is likely to increase audit fees. One other explanation of the positive
relationship between audit fees and institutional holdings is that ﬁrms may purchase high-quality audit ser-
vices to send a positive signal to the market about their ﬁnancial reporting quality in order to attract institu-
tional investment (Mitra et al., 2007).
We run additional analyses with alternative proxies to check the robustness of our main analysis. First we use
alternative measures as control variables (such as log(sales) instead of log(assets), and lagged loss or lagged roa
instead of current loss or roa). Second, we add other control variables (such as number of business segments,
and busy season) and industry eﬀects. Lastly, given the joint audit speciﬁcity of the French auditing context, we
hand collect the auditors names for one year (2008), and include a binary variable coding for the presence of at
least one Big audit ﬁrm (we also test an ordinary variable coding for 0, 1 or 2 Bigs). In all cases, our regressions
include a smaller number of observations due to missing data, but results are similar to the main analysis.
7. Conclusion
The present study examines the empirical relationship between ownership type and audit fees. The basic
premise is that the identity of controlling shareholders inﬂuences the risk of minority expropriation and the
eﬀectiveness of blockholders to monitor corporate aﬀairs, particularly the ﬁnancial reporting process. Glob-
ally speaking, our results provide diﬀerentiated evidence, instead of mixed results stated by previous literature
(Hay et al., 2006), about the association between audit fees and ownership structure.
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governance mechanisms by examining the existence of type II agency conﬂicts in a civil law country (La Porta
et al., 1998). We provide a new explanation about previous mixed results on the relationship between owner-
ship concentration and audit fees by examining the identity of controlling shareholders. We ﬁnd opposite
results for institutional blockholder ownership and state blockholder ownership and audit fees. However,
we ﬁnd no evidence of a relationship between family ownership and audit fees. One possible explanation is
the existence of a trade-oﬀ eﬀect between the decrease in type I agency conﬂict for family controlled ﬁrms
and the increase of type II agency conﬂict, which both inﬂuence the magnitude of audit fees.
However, this study suﬀers from some limitations. First, our variables related to ownership are direct and
not ultimate ownership. Second, following Fan and Wong (2005), we assume that controlling and manage-
ment ownership are stable over the studied period. Despite these limitations, our study aims to improve
our understanding of the complex relationships between audit fees and ownership structure, by studying
non-managerial ownership (Niemi, 2005; Hay et al., 2006). We aim to generalize these results in future
research and examine other institutional contexts of investors’ protection.
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